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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellants are two political activists who were arrested 
for criminal trespassing while distributing Libertarian Party 
literature outside the post office in East Brunswick, New 
Jersey. They brought suit against Kaltenbach, the arresting 
officer, under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging a violation of their 
constitutional rights, as well as violations of state tort law. 
The District Court entered summary judgment for the 
defendant police officer on grounds of qualified immunity. 
We will affirm. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Plaintiff-Appellants John Paff and James Konek are 
officers of the Libertarian Party of Somerset and Middlesex 
Counties in New Jersey. The Libertarian Party is a national 
organization that advocates a free-market economy and 
seeks to "roll back the size of government by replacing 
taxes with voluntary user fees for governmental services." 
To this end, the Party sponsors peaceful demonstrations 
each year on April 15, tax day, to protest the tax burdens 
imposed on American citizens and illustrate the Party's 
opposition to taxes and to the Internal Revenue Service. 
The demonstrations are held each April 15th evening, 
throughout the United States, in front of post office 
buildings where taxpayers go to mail their tax returns. 
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In order to assist in the organization of these rallies, the 
Libertarian National Committee has developed a "Million 
Dollar Tax Day Outreach" package, which is provided to 
Party representatives and contains tips on how to ensure 
an "effective outreach-oriented protest." The mainstay of the 
protest is the distribution of mock $1,000,000 bills, which 
are printed to resemble a Federal Reserve note and, on the 
reverse side, prominently state: "The U.S. Government 
Spends $1,000,000 Every Five Seconds." The fake bill also 
contains additional information about federal government 
appropriations and a coupon designed to be clipped and 
mailed in for more information about the Libertarian Party. 
 
The Outreach Package, designed for the organizers of 
such events, contains information about printing these 
leaflets, selecting a post office, managing volunteers, 
distributing press releases, etc. In a section entitled 
"Problems," the package advises leafletters not to block the 
entrance of the post office; to pick up dropped leaflets; to 
hand out literature to people as they are leaving, rather 
than entering, the post office; and to avoid "unnecessary 
disputes" with post office officials. In the event post office 
officials attempt to remove the demonstrators, the package 
contains a "Legal Memo" expressing the view that the 
demonstrators have a legal right to distribute literature on 
post office property. In this instance, Paff, Chairman of the 
local chapter's Political Awareness Committee, also 
personally researched the relevant law and concluded that 
their planned tax day protest did not violate postal 
regulations and was in fact protected by the First 
Amendment. 
 
On April 10, 1996, Paff mailed a letter to the Postmaster 
of the East Brunswick, New Jersey Post Office, signed by 
the local party chairperson, advising the Postmaster that 
they planned to conduct a tax day protest "on the grounds 
of your facility on the evening of April 15th," and enclosing 
a press release describing the event. The letter further 
explained they had been advised by the national party 
leaders that the planned activities were completely lawful 
and asked that "[i]f you have a different opinion on this 
matter, please advise me prior to the event." The 
Postmaster did not reply. 
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On April 15, 1996, the East Brunswick postal branch 
remained open until midnight to permit its patrons to file 
their 1995 tax returns. At approximately 9:00 p.m. that 
evening, Paff, Konek, and three other tax protesters stood 
on the postal sidewalk area, between the parking lot and 
the front door of the post office. As the postal customers 
exited the building, Paff, Konek, or another party member 
approached some of them and handed them a prepared 
leaflet. 
 
Shortly after the commencement of the leafleting activity, 
the Postmaster, Steve Leddy, emerged from the post office 
and told Paff that he and the other protesters would have 
to move to the public right-of-way, along Cranbury Road. 
The East Brunswick postal building is set back 
approximately 75 feet from the nearest thoroughfare, 
Cranbury Road, which has no adjoining sidewalk. Postal 
customers enter the building via an access road that 
connects with Cranbury Road and depart the facility 
through another access road. As such, the sidewalk area 
where plaintiffs stood is designed specifically to facilitate 
access by postal customers to the post office from the 
parking area. Two newspaper vending machines are located 
on this sidewalk area. 
 
Upon being instructed to move to Cranbury Road, Paff 
explained to the Postmaster that he had researched the 
matter and that he and his fellow protesters had a 
constitutional right to remain there. Leddy then re-entered 
the postal facility and proceeded to call the police. Paff, 
Konek, and the others continued to distribute leaflets. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Officers Kaltenbach and Koslowski 
were dispatched to the scene. Upon their arrival, Leddy 
introduced himself, identified the protesters, and informed 
the officers that he had instructed the protesters to move to 
the public thoroughfare along Cranbury Road, but they had 
refused. Leddy told the officers that, by using the postal 
sidewalk, the protesters were a potential obstruction to 
customers entering and exiting the building on postal 
business. Kaltenbach told Leddy that if the protesters 
refused to move, and if Leddy would sign a complaint, 
Kaltenbach would arrest them. Leddy agreed to sign a 
complaint. 
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Kaltenbach then told the protesters that they could move 
to the public right-of-way beside Cranbury Road, but if they 
remained on the postal sidewalk, they would be arrested. 
Paff explained that he and his fellow protesters had a 
constitutional right to distribute leaflets in front of the post 
office building. Kaltenbach repeated that if they did not 
move, he would arrest them. Paff said that he was the 
"designated arrestee" and that Kaltenbach should arrest 
him because he would not move; thereafter, all of the 
protesters except Paff and Konek left the area. 
 
Kaltenbach then called his lieutenant and explained the 
situation, indicating that he was going to have to arrest two 
of the protesters for trespass. The lieutenant told 
Kaltenbach to bring the Postmaster back to headquarters to 
sign the complaint. Kaltenbach proceeded to arrest both 
Paff and Konek and brought them back to police 
headquarters, along with Postmaster Leddy. Kaltenbach 
also arranged for Konek's car, which was parked at the 
postal facility, to be towed and impounded. At the 
lieutenant's direction, Kaltenbach himself signed the 
complaints, charging Paff and Konek with defiant 
trespassing, in violation of N.J. Stat. S 2C:18-3(b)(1).1 After 
their arrest and booking, bail was set at $5,000, Paff and 
Konek posted bail and were released at 3:00 a.m. the next 
morning, April 16, 1996. 
 
On September 17, 1996, at the request of the East 
Brunswick prosecutor, the East Brunswick Township 
Municipal Court dismissed the charges against Paff and 
Konek. The prosecutor explained that, although Leddy 
initially requested police assistance and indicated his 
willingness to sign the complaints for the arrest of Paff and 
Konek, Leddy thereafter learned of an internal Postal 
Service policy not to prosecute trespassers unless there has 
been a physical obstruction of the postal facility. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The defiant trespass statute provides, in pertinent part, that a 
"person 
commits a petty disorderly offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or 
privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which notice 
against trespass is given by . . . actual communication to the actor." 
N.J. 
Stat. S 2C:18-3(b)(1) (West 1999). 
 
                                5 
  
Paff and Konek subsequently brought suit in U.S. District 
Court against Kaltenbach, alleging violations ofS 1983 and 
state tort law. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that their arrest 
violated their First Amendment right to distribute leaflets 
on the post office sidewalk; that Kaltenbach arrested them 
without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; that Kaltenbach participated in setting 
excessive bail in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and 
that Kaltenbach's impoundment of Konek's car amounted 
to a deprivation of property without due process in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, plaintiffs 
presented common law claims against Kaltenbach for false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, and conversion (of Konek's 
vehicle). 
 
Following discovery, the plaintiffs moved for summary 
judgment as to liability against Kaltenbach, and Kaltenbach 
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all claims 
against him. The District Court granted summary judgment 
to plaintiffs only on their claim that the impoundment of 
Konek's vehicle was improper. As to plaintiffs' First 
Amendment claim, the Court found that plaintiffs had a 
right, protected by the First Amendment, to leaflet on the 
postal sidewalk. The Court granted summary judgment to 
Kaltenbach, however, because it found he was entitled to 
qualified immunity. As to plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment 
claim, the Court found that, based on the advice 
Kaltenbach received from Leddy, he had probable cause to 
arrest plaintiffs. On all remaining claims, the District Court 
also granted summary judgment to Kaltenbach.2 
 
This appeal followed. This Court exercises plenary review 
over a District Court's entry of summary judgment, 
including its determination of a law enforcement officer's 
entitlement to qualified immunity. See In re: City of 
Philadelphia Litigation, 49 F.3d 945, 960 (3d Cir. 1995). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In addition to the First and Fourth Amendment claims discussed 
herein, plaintiffs make two other assertions of error, which we find to be 
without merit. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the District Court 
erred 
in failing to find that (1) Kaltenbach falsely arrested and maliciously 
prosecuted plaintiffs, thereby entitling plaintiffs to punitive damages; 
and (2) Kaltenbach violated plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights by 
imposing an excessive bail requirement on them. 
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM 
 
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government 
officials performing discretionary functions are"shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Under 
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991), before a court 
even addresses a claim of qualified immunity, however, it 
first should determine whether the facts alleged by the 
plaintiff constitute a "violation of a constitutional right at 
all." In this case, the District Court determined that, under 
Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee , 505 U.S. 
672 (1992) ("Lee") and United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 
720 (1990), Paff and Konek had a constitutional right under 
the First Amendment to distribute political literature on 
postal property and that the facts alleged revealed a 
violation of that right. Because appellees did not cross- 
appeal this determination, the only issue before us on 
appeal is the propriety of the District Court's ruling that 
Kaltenbach was entitled to qualified immunity. See Assaf v. 
Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
A court presented with a claim of qualified immunity 
must examine both the law that was clearly established at 
the time of the alleged violation and the facts available to 
the official at that time, and must then determine, in light 
of both, whether a reasonable official could have believed 
his conduct was lawful. See Good v. Dauphin County Social 
Serv. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 
1989). Accordingly, we first examine the state of the 
relevant law at the time of the arrest of both Paff and Konek 
and then turn to an analysis of the information available to 
Kaltenbach at that time. The ultimate issue will then be 
whether, given the established law and the information 
available to Kaltenbach, a reasonable law enforcement 
officer in Kaltenbach's position could have believed that his 
conduct was lawful. 
 
The Supreme Court has "adopted a forum analysis as a 
means of determining when the Government's interest in 
limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose 
outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property 
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for other purposes. Accordingly, the extent to which the 
Government can control access depends on the nature of 
the relevant forum." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). When the 
relevant public property is determined to be a "non-public 
forum," rather than an "open forum" or a"designated 
forum," the government has greater freedom to restrict 
speech. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 
460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
 
In United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of postal 
regulations that prohibited the solicitation of"alms and 
contributions" on post office property.3 In the course of its 
analysis, a four-Justice plurality determined that a post 
office sidewalk was a non-public forum. The sidewalk, like 
the sidewalk here, was located between the parking lot and 
the post office, at some distance from the nearby road, and 
was constructed solely to assist patrons of the post office.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In full, the postal regulation upheld in Kokinda provides: 
 
       Soliciting alms and contributions, campaigning for election to any 
       public office, collecting private debts, commercial soliciting and 
       vending, and displaying or distributing commercial advertising on 
       postal premises are prohibited. 
 
39 C.F.R. S 232.1(h)(1) (1989). 
 
4. Rejecting the argument that the postal sidewalk is indistinguishable 
from the municipal sidewalk that runs along side the road, the Kokinda 
Court explained: 
 
       The postal sidewalk at issue does not have the characteristics of 
       public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activity. The 
       municipal sidewalk that runs parallel to the road in this case is a 
       public passageway. The Postal Service's sidewalk is not such a 
       thoroughfare. Rather, it leads only from the parking area to the 
       front door of the post office. Unlike the public street described 
in 
       Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 
452 
       U.S. 640 (1981), which was "continually open, often uncongested, 
       and constitute[d] not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs 
of 
       a locality's citizens, but also a place where people[could] enjoy 
the 
       open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed 
       environment," id., at 651, the postal sidewalk was constructed 
solely 
       to provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal 
business. 
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Because the sidewalk was a non-public forum, the plurality 
concluded that the "government's decision to restrict access 
. . . need only be reasonable." Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 
U.S. at 806). The prohibition was found to be reasonable 
"because solicitation is inherently disruptive of the Postal 
Service's business." Id. at 732. Justice Kennedy, 
concurring, found the regulations constitutional even if the 
sidewalk was a public forum, as the dissenters contended. 
 
In United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1986), 
this Court foreshadowed the ruling in Kokinda  when it 
upheld the constitutionality of the same postal regulation. 
Like the Kokinda plurality, the Bjerke  court also found the 
postal sidewalk at issue in that case to be a non-public 
forum and rejected the argument that the presence of 
"newspaper vending machines and a gumball machine 
encouraging charitable contributions" converted the area 
into a public forum. As the court there explained,"that the 
government permits selective access to a nontraditional 
forum does not manifest an intent to designate an area a 
public forum for all expressive purposes." Id. at 649. We 
held that it was not unreasonable for postal officials to 
believe that solicitation held the potential for interference 
"with their mission to provide reliable postal services." Id. at 
650. 
 
Since Bjerke and Kokinda, both of which addressed bans 
on solicitation, a restriction on leafleting was considered by 
the Supreme Court in Lee v. Int'l Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (incorporating 
concurring opinions at 505 U.S. 672 (1992)). In Lee, the 
Court considered both a ban on the solicitation of funds 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       The sidewalk leading to the entry of the post office is not the 
       traditional public forum sidewalk referred to in Perry. Nor is the 
       right of access under consideration in this case the quintessential 
       public sidewalk which we addressed in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 
       474 (1988) (residential sidewalk). The postal sidewalk was 
       constructed solely to assist postal patrons to negotiate the space 
       between the parking lot and the front door of the post office, not 
to 
       facilitate the daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or city. 
 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727. 
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within the airports of the New York/New Jersey Port 
Authority, as well as a ban on the "repetitive distribution of 
printed or written materials." It concluded that the airport 
terminals were non-public fora, applying the 
reasonableness standard, despite the fact "that the public 
spaces in the airports are broad, public thoroughfares full 
of people and lined with stores and other commercial 
activities." 505 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The 
Court upheld the solicitation ban but struck down the 
leafleting ban. The challenged leafleting regulation was a 
complete and permanent prohibition on the "sale or 
distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or any 
other printed or written material," if conducted within the 
airport terminal, "in a continuous or repetitive manner." 
 
The leafleting issue was resolved in a per curiam opinion 
that cited "the reasons set forth in the opinions of " Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter filed in the appeal relating 
to the ban on solicitation. Central to the reasoning of all 
three was the view that, in contrast to "discrete, single 
purpose facilities" like the post office in Kokinda, the 
airports were "operating a shopping mall as well as an 
airport." 505 U.S. at 688-89. For the majority of justices 
who had concluded that the non-public forum analysis was 
appropriate, "the reasonable inquiry, therefore,[was] not 
whether the restrictions on speech are `consistent with . . . 
preserving the property for air travel, . . . but whether they 
[were] reasonably related to maintaining the multi-purpose 
environment that the Port Authority [had] deliberately 
created." Id. at 689. The Court held that they were not. 
 
Finally, reference to Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local 
Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (upholding rule 
granting teachers' bargaining representative exclusive 
access to teacher mailboxes and the interschool mail 
system to the exclusion of a rival union), and Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) 
(upholding executive order limiting participation in a 
charity drive aimed at federal employees and military 
personnel), is appropriate. In each, the relevant forum was 
found to be a non-public one. In each, the issue for 
decision was whether the public agency involved was 
reasonable in believing that the prohibited expression might 
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interfere with its mission, and in each, the party attacking 
the restraint stressed that there was no evidence of actual 
interference having occurred. In Perry, the Court responded 
by acknowledging that there was "no showing in the record 
of past disturbances stemming from [the prohibited] access" 
to the forum "or evidence that future disturbances would be 
likely." Nevertheless, it pointed out that the Court had "not 
required that such proof be present to justify the denial of 
access to a non-public forum on grounds that the proposed 
use may disrupt the property's intended function." Perry, 
460 U.S. at 52 n.12. In Cornelius, the Court responded 
"that the Government need not wait until havoc is wreaked 
to restrict access to a non-public forum." 473 U.S. at 810. 
 
The existing caselaw at the time of the arrests thus 
clearly established a number of relevant principles. First, a 
sidewalk like the one involved here is a non-public forum. 
This follows from Kokinda, Bjerke, and, a fortiori, from Lee. 
Second, a public agency may place reasonable restrictions 
on speech in a non-public forum. Third, "a restriction on 
speech in a non-public forum is `reasonable' when it is 
`consistent with the [government's] legitimate interest in 
preserv[ing] the property . . . for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated." Lee, 505 U.S. at 688 (quoting Perry). 
And finally, restrictions on speech in a non-public forum 
may be imposed if it is reasonable to anticipate that 
interference with the mission of the agency may  occur, even 
though it has not yet occurred. 
 
We now turn to the information available to Kaltenbach 
at the time of the arrests. As soon as Kaltenbach arrived on 
the scene, Postmaster Leddy identified himself as the 
official responsible for the premises and the carrying out of 
the mission of the postal facility. It was an extraordinary 
evening for that postal facility; it was still open at 9:00 P.M. 
because midnight was the deadline for postmarking tax 
returns. Accordingly, a heavy public utilization of the postal 
facility could be expected. Leddy explained to Kaltenbach 
that the protesters were a potential obstruction to 
customers entering and exiting the building on postal 
business and that they could not remain on the postal 
sidewalk. In the event the protestors refused to move their 
distribution to the public rights-of-way, Leddy said he 
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would come to police headquarters and sign a complaint so 
that charges could be pressed against the protesters. 
Kaltenbach then confronted the protestors and learned that 
they claimed to have a constitutional right to distribute 
leaflets on the sidewalk. They refused to withdraw to the 
public roadway, and he made his decision to arrest. 
 
This brings us to the issue of whether, given the 
established law and the information available to 
Kaltenbach, a reasonable law enforcement officer in his 
position could have believed his conduct was legal. We 
agree with the plaintiffs that a reasonable law enforcement 
officer in Kaltenbach's position would have known, based 
on Kokinda and Lee, that the protestors could be precluded 
from distributing leaflets on the post office sidewalk only if 
it was reasonable under all of the circumstances for the 
postal authorities to prohibit that activity. However, we do 
not believe that a reasonable officer would understand the 
caselaw to mandate a conclusion that the restriction here 
imposed was unreasonable. While Lee struck down a 
prohibition on leafleting in large airports, there are material 
distinctions between the situation there addressed and the 
one that faced Kaltenbach. The purpose to which the 
property is dedicated is crucial to the reasonableness 
analysis, and as the Supreme Court itself noted, the 
purpose to which the airports in Lee were dedicated was far 
different from that of a sidewalk between a post office and 
its parking lot. Moreover, the ban on leafleting in Lee was 
a permanent one. The ban imposed by Leddy and enforced 
by Kaltenbach was a temporary, one time measure to 
address an extraordinary situation which Leddy said held 
the potential for interfering with the mission of the facility. 
 
In our view, a reasonable law enforcement officer with 
knowledge of the relevant legal principles and the 
information available would have done exactly what 
Kaltenbach did here. Given the postmaster's responsibility 
for and experience with the postal facility, it was reasonable 
for Kaltenbach to accept his judgment that the leafleting 
activity, if continued, would impede the public in making 
timely use of the postal facility. And given that factual 
predicate, Kaltenbach had every reason to believe that the 
restraint imposed was a constitutionally valid one. 
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Leddy was a public officer whom Kaltenbach could 
reasonably presume to be familiar with the conditions likely 
to be encountered at the facility on that evening. For 
example, more so than any officer just arriving on the 
scene, a postmaster could be expected to know relevant 
facts, like how much customer traffic through the postal 
facility is to be expected between 9 P.M. and midnight on 
April 15th, the extent to which conflicts have erupted in the 
past between protesters and customers on postal property, 
and whether protesters have previously leafleted effectively 
along the public right-of-way on Cranbury Road. Such facts 
were necessary to an analysis of the reasonableness of the 
restriction Leddy sought to impose. To require an officer to 
assess the reasonableness of a restriction such as this one 
without reference to the postmaster's unique knowledge 
would strip the determination of the very facts essential to 
its making. 
 
We do not, of course, suggest that a law enforcement 
officer will always act reasonably in relying on the facts 
provided by a custodian of public property. We hold as we 
do because the applicable law required a detailed factual 
assessment; the facts necessary to make that assessment 
were otherwise unavailable to Kaltenbach; and there was 
no reason to question the good faith of the custodian. 
Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, we do not believe a 
reasonable law enforcement officer would have second- 
guessed the Postmaster simply because no actual 
obstruction of the sidewalk had yet occurred. As we noted 
earlier, "the Government need not wait until havoc is 
wreaked to restrict access to a non-public forum." Cornelius 
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 810 
(1985).5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The applicable postal regulations prohibit any activity "which 
obstructs the usual use of entrances . . . or which impedes or disturbs 
the general public in transacting business or obtaining the services 
provided on [post office] property . . . ." 39 C.F.R. S 232.1(e). As we 
read 
these regulations, they anticipate that local postmasters will be required 
to exercise discretion as to whether particular conduct in particular 
circumstances is likely to "obstruct," "impede," or "disturb." The 
regulations expressly authorize "[l]ocal postmasters . . . [to] enter into 
agreements with State and local enforcement agencies to ensure that the 
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In sum, Kokinda and Lee clearly establish that 
reasonable restrictions on speech on postal property are 
permissible. Because we believe a reasonable officer would, 
and in fact should, consider the views of the postmaster in 
this situation, we have no difficulty concluding that 
Kaltenbach could have believed the restriction imposed 
here was reasonable, and that his own conduct was 
therefore lawful. Thus, Kaltenbach is protected by the 
doctrine of qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiffs' 
claimed violation of their First Amendment rights. 
 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from 
arresting a citizen without probable cause. See Orsatti v. 
New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 
(1972)). After their arrest, plaintiffs were charged with 
violating New Jersey's criminal defiant trespass statute. 
N.J. Stat. S 2C:18-3(b)(1) (West 1999).6 Under this statute, 
"[a] person commits a petty disorderly offense if, knowing 
that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or 
remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is 
given by . . . actual communication to the actor." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
. . . rules and regulations are enforced." Id. S 232.1(q)(2). There is 
thus 
authority that Postmaster Leddy could cite in support of his right to 
make the decision he made on the evening in question. Accordingly, it is 
not at all clear to us, as it is to the dissent, that the activity of Paff 
and 
Konek at the time of their arrest was "indisputably legal." We stress, 
however, that we have no occasion to address here whether Postmaster 
Leddy violated the First Amendment or whether, if sued, he would be 
entitled to qualified immunity. We hold only that, given the clearly 
established law and the information available to Kaltenbach, a 
reasonable law enforcement officer in his position could have believed his 
conduct was lawful. 
 
6. "Probable cause need only exist as to any offense that could be 
charged under the circumstances." Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 
F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). However, the defiant 
trespass statute is the only statute to which Kaltenbach points as 
justification for the arrests. 
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Plaintiffs contend that there was no probable cause to 
believe that they were committing this offense. 7 
 
Plaintiffs' argument is straightforward. They observe that 
an essential element of the offense for which they were 
arrested is that the alleged trespasser subjectively knew he 
was not licensed or privileged to be on the property in 
question. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 527 A.2d 963, 965 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (conviction reversed where 
reasonable doubt existed as to whether defendant 
subjectively knew she was not privileged to enter). Paff and 
Konek insist that according to the undisputed evidence 
regarding the facts available to Kaltenbach at the time of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In their briefs before this Court, Paff and Konek maintain that 
"Officer 
Kaltenbach also lacked probable cause to arrest[them] because the state 
criminal statute pursuant to which he made the arrest does not 
criminalize the activities at issue on postal property." Brief for 
Appellants 
at 35. To support their argument, plaintiffs rely on the Assimilative 
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. S 13(a), which provides that: 
 
       Whoever within or upon any [federal enclave], is guilty of any act 
or 
       omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of 
       Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the 
       jurisdiction of the State . . . in which such place is situated, . 
. . 
       shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment. 
 
Plaintiffs' principle argument is that 39 C.F.R.S 232.1 (entitled "Conduct 
on Postal Property") represents a detailed federal enactment that fully 
regulates activities conducted on postal property and, thus, preempts 
related state laws. 
 
In Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 118 S. Ct. 1135, 1141-42 
(1998), the Supreme Court held that, where a congressional enactment 
applies to the act or omission at issue, courts must determine whether 
the "applicable federal law indicate[s] an intent to punish conduct such 
as the defendant's to the exclusion of the particular state statute at 
issue." If not, then the state criminal statute is applicable, 
notwithstanding the fact that the crime occurred in a federal enclave. In 
this case, the relevant legislative intent could not be clearer. 
Subsection 
(p)(2) of the postal regulations expressly provides that "[n]othing 
contained in these rules and regulations shall be construed to abrogate 
. . . any State and local laws and regulations applicable to any area in 
which the property is situated." 39 C.F.R. S 232.1(p)(2). Given such a 
clear statement, we have no trouble concluding that New Jersey's 
trespass laws are applicable to plaintiffs' conduct. 
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the arrest, they not only subjectively believed (i.e., "knew") 
that they were privileged to distribute leaflets on the 
sidewalk, but that Paff explained this belief to both Leddy 
and Kaltenbach. In addition, plaintiffs contend that the 
undisputed facts reveal no evidence that Konek "knew" 
anything different. Thus, according to plaintiffs, all of the 
evidence available to Kaltenbach at the time of the arrest 
established that Paff and Konek believed that they were 
constitutionally privileged to remain on the property and, 
as a result, there was insufficient evidence from which 
Kaltenbach could have found probable cause as to this 
essential element of the offense. 
 
Kaltenbach responds that he had probable cause to 
believe the plaintiffs knew they were not privileged to 
remain on the postal sidewalk as soon as he learned that 
the plaintiffs had been so advised by the postmaster. Such 
probable cause was reinforced, he contends, once 
Kaltenbach himself discussed the matter with the plaintiffs. 
Paff informed him that he was the "designated arrestee," 
thereby indicating that advance consideration had been 
given to the legality of the proposed protest and that the 
protesters recognized that law enforcement authorities 
might, at least under some circumstances, view it as illegal. 
 
Probable cause to arrest exists when the information 
within the arresting officer's knowledge at the time of the 
arrest is sufficient to warrant a reasonable law enforcement 
officer to believe that an offense has been or is being 
committed by the person to be arrested. See United States 
v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990). It"is a fluid 
concept -- turning on the assessment of probabilities in 
particular factual context -- not readily, or even usually, 
reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 232 (1983). While probable cause to arrest 
requires more than mere suspicion, the law recognizes that 
probable cause determinations have to be made "on the 
spot" under pressure and do "not require thefine resolution 
of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or even a 
preponderance standard demands." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 121 (1975). A " `common sense' approach [must 
be taken] to the issue of probable cause" and a 
determination as to its existence must be based on"the 
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totality of the circumstances." Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 
810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The leading Supreme Court case on the application of the 
doctrine of qualified immunity in the context of a 
determination of probable cause is Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635 (1987). The Court there noted "the difficulty 
of determining whether particular searches or seizures 
comport with the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 644. Because 
reasonable minds can differ on whether particular arrests 
meet the imprecise standards of probable cause we have 
just discussed, the Court recognized that not every 
determination that probable cause was lacking requires a 
finding that the arresting officer is liable for damages. Room 
must be provided for reasonable mistakes. As the Court put 
it: 
 
       We have recognized that it is inevitable that law 
       enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but 
       mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, 
       and we have indicated that in such cases those officials 
       -- like other officials who act in ways they reasonably 
       believe to be lawful -- should not be held personally 
       liable. 
 
Id. at 641. 
 
The Anderson Court noted the general rule that "whether 
an officer protected by qualified immunity may be held 
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful action generally 
turns on the `objective legal reasonableness' of the action 
. . . assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly 
established at the time it was taken." Id.  at 639. It then 
explained that in the context of a probable cause 
determination, a determination regarding whether the 
relevant law was clearly established must take into account 
the specific circumstances that confronted the officer. "[T]he 
right the official is alleged to have violated must have been 
`clearly established' in a . . . particularized .. . sense. The 
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right. This is not to say that an official action 
is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in 
question has previously been held unlawful, . . . but it is to 
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say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness 
must be apparent." Id. at 640. 
 
We understand Anderson to require us to look at the 
circumstances that confronted Kaltenbach and to compare 
the circumstances present in those cases which have 
concluded that there was an absence of probable cause. If 
there are cases that would make it "apparent " to a 
reasonable officer in Kaltenbach's position that probable 
cause was lacking, qualified immunity is not available. Id. 
(emphasis added). If not, Kaltenbach is entitled to qualified 
immunity. As the Anderson Court noted, "qualified 
immunity protects `all but the plainly incompetent or those 
who knowingly violate the law.' " Id. at 638 (quoting Malley 
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 
 
Absent a confession, the officer considering the probable 
cause issue in the context of crime requiring a mens rea on 
the part of the suspect will always be required to rely on 
circumstantial evidence regarding the state of his or her 
mind. Ordinarily, information supporting a conclusion that 
the potential defendant in a trespass case was not licensed 
or privileged and that he was so advised by the custodian 
of the property will provide sufficient circumstantial 
evidence to constitute probable cause on the mens rea 
element. Moreover, this will normally be true even where 
the potential defendant, upon being confronted by a law 
enforcement officer, makes a claim of entitlement to be on 
the premises. 
 
Kaltenbach learned information prior to the arrest which 
provided probable cause to believe that Paff and Konek 
were not licensed or privileged and that they had been so 
advised by the custodian of the property. What makes the 
probable cause/mens rea issue more difficult here than in 
most trespass cases are the facts that this was public 
property, Paff and Konek were engaged in expressive 
activity, and they expressly purported to be acting on legal 
advice specifically addressed to the issue of license or 
privilege. 
 
Kaltenbach was required to make a judgment call 
regarding plaintiffs' state of mind. Paff and Konek told 
Kaltenbach that they believed they were entitled to be 
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leafleting on the sidewalk and offered a plausible 
explanation for that belief. Nevertheless, we find nothing in 
the probable cause jurisprudence that makes it apparent 
that Kaltenbach was required to accept that assertion at 
face value. The existence of a "designated arrestee" 
indicated that Paff and Konek realized that there were 
circumstances under which their planned conduct might be 
viewed as illegal by law enforcement authorities, and they 
had been advised by the postmaster that their conduct, if 
continued through the evening, was likely to lead to an 
obstruction of post office patrons. A belief in the general 
right to leaflet on post office property is not inconsistent 
with knowledge that potentially obstructive conduct is 
illegal. 
 
Kaltenbach had to make a judgment based on 
circumstantial evidence. The issue was close enough that 
there was the potential of a court subsequently determining 
that he made the wrong choice. In light of the clearly 
established law and the information available to him, 
however, his choice was not objectively unreasonable and 
suggests neither that he was incompetent nor that he 
knowingly violated the law. Accordingly, we conclude that 
he is entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment to Kaltenbach on all counts. 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
In this appeal we must decide whether a police officer is 
entitled to qualified immunity when, on the night federal 
income taxes were due, he arrested John Paff and James 
Konek, who stood on a sidewalk outside a post office, 
handing out leaflets protesting the government's taxation 
policies. At the time of the arrests peaceful leafleting on a 
postal sidewalk was indisputably legal: the controlling 
postal regulation does not ban leafleting and instead only 
prohibits disorderly conduct and soliciting alms or 
contributions. See 39 C.F.R. S 232.1. If there were any 
doubt about how to interpret this regulation, we have 
previously said, while upholding the ban on solicitation, 
that protesters can distribute leaflets: 
 
       [Protesters] may publicly express their views while on 
       postal property, they may distribute political literature, 
       and engage patrons in any lawful dialogue. In fact, they 
       may even solicit financial contributions immediately 
       outside postal premises, and perhaps even on certain 
       portions of postal property. They are simply required 
       not to engage in solicitations at a place where such 
       activities would obstruct necessary and nonpolitical 
       post office operations. 
 
United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643, 652-63 (3d Cir. 
1986). The availability of leafleting was important to our 
decision in Bjerke because in upholding the regulation's 
ban on solicitation we relied in part on the fact that 
leafleting and other types of expressive activity remain 
legal. Id. at 650. 
 
Several years after Bjerke five Justices on the Supreme 
Court also interpreted the relevant postal regulation to 
allow peaceful leafleting, and the remaining four Justices 
never maintained that the regulation prohibits it. In Justice 
Kennedy's concurrence he said, "The regulation, as the 
United States concedes, expressly permits the respondents 
and all others to engage in political speech on topics of 
their choice and to distribute literature soliciting support, 
including money contributions, provided there is no in- 
person solicitation for payments on the premises." United 
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 738-39, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 
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3126 (1990). Much as we reasoned in Bjerke, Justice 
Kennedy also relied in part on the availability of these other 
expressive activities when he concurred in the Court's 
judgment that the solicitation ban was permissible. Id. at 
739, 110 S.Ct. at 3126. The four Justices in dissent 
similarly agreed that the postal regulation permits"labor 
picketing, soapbox oratory, distributing literature, holding 
political rallies, playing music, circulating petitions, or any 
other form of speech not specifically mentioned in the 
regulation." Id. at 750, 110 S.Ct. at 3132. Even Justice 
O'Connor's opinion for the remaining four Justices 
conceded that "individuals or groups have been permitted 
to leaflet, speak, and picket on postal premises," and never 
expressly said that the regulation prohibited such conduct. 
Id. at 730, 110 S.Ct. at 3121. 
 
Thus it is clearly established that under the postal 
regulation protesters have a legal right to hand out leaflets, 
provided they do not engage in disorderly conduct or solicit 
money to be paid on the postal premises. Because the 
undisputed facts show that Paff and Konek were leafleting 
peacefully and were not engaging in unlawful solicitation, 
Officer Kaltenbach did not have probable cause to arrest 
them, and therefore they have a valid claim under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Mackinney v. 
Nielson, 69 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995) (because California 
law did not prohibit individuals from writing in chalk on a 
public sidewalk, the officer who arrested the plaintiff was 
not entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiff 's 
Fourth Amendment claim). 
 
The majority apparently believes that Kaltenbach had 
probable cause to arrest Paff and Konek because the 
protesters were potentially an obstruction (although the 
majority raises this point in its discussion of the First 
Amendment claim). But the regulation's prohibition of 
disorderly conduct can hardly be construed to make an 
offense out of "potentially" committing disorderly conduct. 
The portion of the regulation addressing disorderly conduct 
states, 
 
       Disorderly conduct, or conduct which creates loud and 
       unusual noise, or which obstructs the usual use of 
       entrances, foyers, corridors, offices, elevators, 
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       stairways, and parking lots, or which otherwise tends 
       to impede or disturb the public in the performance of 
       their duties, or which otherwise impedes or disturbs 
       the general public in transacting business or obtaining 
       the services provided on property, is prohibited. 
 
39 C.F.R. S 232.1(e). The majority suggests in footnote 5 of 
its opinion that this provision gives local postmasters 
discretion to decide whether someone's conduct is"likely" 
to violate S 232.1(e) and that police may rely on the 
postmaster's judgment. Nowhere in the regulation does the 
word "likely" appear; the provision prohibits actual 
disorderly conduct, not potential disorderly conduct. Not 
only is the majority's position unsupported by the language 
of the regulation, it also appears to subject members of the 
public to a fine or imprisonment, see S 232.1(p)(2), or arrest 
at a minimum, because a postmaster deems them likely to 
commit an offense, even though their conduct has been 
innocent so far. How will people know when they are 
potentially committing disorderly conduct as they try to 
enjoy their judicially recognized right to leaflet peacefully? 
The Supreme Court has firmly rejected laws for vagueness. 
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales , ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 
1849 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 
1855 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 
156, 92 S.Ct. 839 (1972). The Court has also rejected 
arrests for disorderly conduct when the police thought the 
protesters' conduct was likely to result in disorderly 
conduct. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 89 S.Ct. 
946 (1969). And the Court has rejected a law that made 
illegal having a disposition to commit an offense. Robinson 
v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417 (1962). 
 
To appreciate the dangers of allowing arrests for 
"potentially" committing disorderly conduct, I think it is 
worth reviewing in some detail just how little evidence there 
is that the plaintiffs' leafleting was creating any problem. 
According to the undisputed facts, before Paff or Konek 
handed a leaflet to anyone, they first asked if the person 
wanted one and were not confrontational. The two only 
approached people leaving the post office, and were joined 
by a total of three other protesters, hardly creating a 
threatening rally. While it may seem reasonable to assume 
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that this particular post office was busy on the night taxes 
were due, there is no evidence or allegation that a large 
number of people in fact were crowding into this post office. 
For all we know one person passed every ten minutes. The 
post office in question is also set back from the road and 
appears, in some admittedly dark photocopied pictures in 
the appendix, to be surrounded by a fair amount of open 
land, suggesting that the protesters were not standing in 
close quarters. Paff stated that he and the four other 
protesters "stood on the sidewalk area between the parking 
lot and the front door of the East Brunswick Post Office" 
and were "within two feet" of some newspaper vending 
machines. App. at 60. 
 
In the postmaster's call to the police department, he 
made no reference to any obstruction that the protesters 
were creating. A transcript of that call shows that after 
identifying himself, the postmaster said, "We have people 
on the property giving out pamphlets, we've asked them to 
leave the property and they won't. Could you send 
somebody down?" He explained that the post office was 
open until midnight and then made a partially inaudible 
remark about picket signs. "With picket signs?" the 
dispatcher asked. The postmaster responded, "Yes, it's a 
Libertarian party or something." He continued,"They can 
go out on public property which is out by the street so they 
can't be on our sidewalk in front of our front door." After 
the postmaster gave his name, the dispatcher said,"O . . . 
okay, we'll send someone out." App. at 160. This is all the 
relevant information the postmaster conveyed to the police 
dispatcher. 
 
When Kaltenbach arrived, the postmaster again identified 
himself and said that the protesters could move out to 
Cranbury Road. On the record before us there is no 
evidence--or even allegation--that the postmaster told 
Officer Kaltenbach that the protesters had obstructed the 
ingress or egress of patrons of the post office, much less 
that the postmaster offered any evidence in support of such 
an allegation had it been made. At best the postmaster told 
Kaltenbach the protesters were a "potential obstruction,"1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Kaltenbach's statement of undisputed facts he asserts that the 
postmaster told him that the protesters were a "potential obstruction." 
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an assertion that by itself is insufficient to provide probable 
cause for the arrest and that in any event seems poorly 
supported, given the protesters' small numbers and their 
peaceful conduct. 
 
By comparison, when the police have invoked the risk 
posed by a hostile audience to justify arresting protesters 
who were conducting an otherwise lawful demonstration, 
the Supreme Court has required considerably more 
evidence of imminent harm than was present in our case. 
See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago , 394 U.S. 111, 89 S.Ct. 
946 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct. 453 
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 
680 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894 
(1949). Given that the leafleting in our case was legal, I 
believe that there should have been much more evidence of 
an imminent and significant disruption before an arrest 
was made. "[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the 
right to freedom of expression." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 
737 (1969); Zamboni v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 78 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
 
It is also worth noting that the postmaster's suggested 
alternative that the protesters move out to the public road 
was highly problematic. As Paff explained, Cranbury Road 
did not have a sidewalk and was unlit (events took place at 
9 p.m. on April 15th); and it was not possible to hand out 
leaflets to passengers in cars that Paff estimated were 
traveling approximately 40 miles per hour through the 
night. See App. at 173-74. Furthermore, although the 
majority suggests that the postmaster's ban on the 
protester's leafleting was limited to tax night, nothing in the 
record indicates that the postmaster said his ban was 
restricted in this way. He simply called the police and asked 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
App. at 170. The appellants' response to Kaltenbach's statement of 
undisputed facts denies that the postmaster made that statement. App. 
at 180. But because Kaltenbach repeated his claim in a certification, and 
the certification Paff submitted did not mention whether the postmaster 
alleged they were a "potential obstruction," it appears that we should 
accept Kaltenbach's allegation for the purposes of this summary 
judgment motion. 
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them to remove the protesters. And even if we adopted this 
after the fact narrowing of the restriction, the message the 
protestors sought to convey was undermined when they 
were not allowed to conduct their protest on tax day. In the 
end, however, I think that even if Cranbury Road had 
offered a viable alternative or the postmaster had limited 
his ban to tax night, neither factor would be enough to 
justify qualified immunity; the protesters had a right to 
leaflet peacefully where they were. 
 
When an officer violates clearly established law and the 
facts reasonably known by the officer indisputably show 
that the officer's conduct was illegal, qualified immunity is 
rarely appropriate. An officer can only obtain qualified 
immunity for violating clearly established law when the 
officer shows "extraordinary circumstances and can prove 
that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant 
legal standard." In re City of Philadelphia Litigation, 49 F.3d 
945, 961 (3d Cir. 1995)(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 817-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982)). 
 
Under this standard Kaltenbach's reliance on the 
postmaster should not constitute "extraordinary 
circumstances." Even reliance on the advice of counsel may 
not be sufficient to constitute extraordinary circumstances. 
See, e.g., Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 
1998) cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 902 (1999); Buonocore v. 
Harris, 134 F.3d 245, 252-53 (4th Cir. 1998); V-1 Oil Co. v. 
Wyoming, 902 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1990). And the burden 
of proving extraordinary circumstances is carried by the 
officer. Buonocore, 134 F.3d at 252; Cannon v. City and 
County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 874 (10th Cir. 1993). In 
our case the postmaster did not mention any legal 
authority for his action, despite the fact that Paff cited the 
postal regulation that he said allowed him to leaflet. 
Kaltenbach also did not perform so much as a cursory 
independent investigation to see if the protesters were 
posing any problem, nor did he inquire into whether their 
conduct actually was illegal. It is true that after arresting 
Paff, Kaltenbach radioed his supervisor, but even if we 
make the dubious assumption that this call could 
constitute "extraordinary circumstances," a transcript of 
that conversation shows that the purpose was not to obtain 
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advice on whether the leafleting was legal, but merely to 
advise headquarters that Kaltenbach was bringing in the 
arrestees. Moreover, Kaltenbach could have made 
additional inquiries given that, as the facts above indicate, 
the protesters' conduct was not creating an impending 
conflict requiring immediate action. 
 
The protesters' claim under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments poses closer questions. The majority operates 
under the assumption that unless the protesters can show 
that the First Amendment clearly prohibits the Postal 
Service from issuing any regulation prohibiting leafleting, 
then the protesters must lose their claim under the First 
Amendment. I disagree with this assumption. If the postal 
regulations permit leafleting, then I think the protesters 
have a valid First Amendment claim, even if the clearly 
established law does not flatly prohibit the Postal Service 
from banning all leafleting in the future. Much as the 
government cannot discriminate among speakers when it 
creates a limited-purpose public forum, see, e.g., Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68, 102 S.Ct. 269, 273-74 
(1981), the government also violates the First Amendment 
in my view if it has people in a nonpublic forum arrested 
for engaging in a type of expressive activity that the 
government's own regulations permit. This should be 
especially true when the government's regulation was saved 
from a First Amendment challenge in part because the 
regulation permitted that particular type of expressive 
activity. 
 
But suppose the majority is right, and the protesters 
must show that the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from issuing regulations that ban leafleting on 
postal sidewalks deemed to be nonpublic forums. Given 
that the Postal Service has not yet tried to issue such 
regulations, it may seem precipitate to reach this issue. The 
majority's view seems to require the discussion, however, so 
I will offer several comments on their analysis. If the 
protesters must show that postal regulations cannot ban 
leafleting, then like the majority I conclude that the 
protesters' First Amendment claim must fail--the relevant 
right is not yet clearly established. But I hasten to add that 
since Kaltenbach did not cross-appeal the District Court's 
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finding that the protesters had a constitutional right under 
the First Amendment to leaflet, under our recent decision, 
Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 1999), the 
ultimate question of whether the government does have the 
power to ban all leafleting is not before us. 
 
In analyzing what is clearly established I agree with the 
majority that the sidewalk leading to the post office in this 
case is a nonpublic forum, or at least that in the wake of 
Kokinda the status of the sidewalk is unclear. I also agree 
that the government can impose reasonable restrictions on 
speech in a nonpublic forum, where a reasonable 
restriction is one that is "consistent with the[government's] 
legitimate interest in preserv[ing] the property . . . for the 
use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Majority Op. at 11 
(quoting Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 
505 U.S. 672, 688, 112 S.Ct. 2711, 2712 (1992) and Perry 
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 
50-51, 103 S.Ct. 948, 958 (1983)). 
 
My reasoning differs from the majority's, however, 
because I rely exclusively on two doctrinal points to 
conclude that the relevant right is not clearly established. 
First, Kokinda plainly left the issue unresolved. Second, 
and much more crucially, when the Supreme Court rejected 
a ban on leafleting in Lee, Justice O'Connor's concurrence 
emphasized that the airport in question was run in part as 
a shopping mall, supporting many activities, and therefore 
was unlike other nonpublic forums considered by the 
Court, such as the postal sidewalk in Kokinda  in particular. 
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 688-89, 112 S.Ct. at 2712-73. Given 
the airport's multiple uses, Justice O'Connor's opinion 
judged leafleting to be consistent with the functions of the 
forum. 
 
After reviewing this caselaw, a reasonable official could 
conclude that postal sidewalks are designed simply to give 
access to the post office and that, therefore, Lee's protection 
of leafleting did not apply and Kokinda does not require 
otherwise. These points alone are sufficient, I believe, to 
defeat the claim that it is clearly established that the First 
Amendment prohibits the government from implementing 
regulations that ban leafleting on postal sidewalks deemed 
to be nonpublic forums. One does not need to bring in the 
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majority's points about the protesters posing a potential 
obstruction or about police officers delegating their 
decisionmaking to a postmaster. Neither of these latter 
factors would justify granting qualified immunity if the 
relevant right were otherwise clearly established. 
 
But in the end whatever the power of the Postal Service 
is to ban leafleting on its sidewalks, the fundamental point 
in this case is that no such ban has been implemented. 
Leafleting is clearly legal under the Postal Service's 
regulations, and therefore I cannot agree that Kaltenbach is 
entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' claims 
under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
plaintiffs' leafleting and criticism of the government should 
not have been suppressed. 
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